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**Sleight-of-Hand Nuclear Disarmament:
How Pugwash Should Respond**
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Introduction

The convergence of several factors concerning the role of the United States in nuclear disarmament makes this a seminal moment for the Pugwash movement, which has chosen the U.S. for the venue of its forthcoming quinquennial review. The 52nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, at UCSD in La Jolla, California, August 9-14, will lay the groundwork for the Pugwash Council to set policy for the next five years. This paper, on behalf of the Canadian Pugwash Group, argues that Pugwash, despite the present political climate, must not allow the elimination of nuclear weapons to become a receding goal; rather Pugwash must speak out unambiguously to press the nuclear weapons states to fulfill the “unequivocal undertaking” they have made to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals through implementation of all 13 Practical Steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this context, Pugwash must give special attention to the role of the United States.

The United States as ‘Hyperpower’

A new moment has arrived in world affairs with the emergence of the U.S. as a hyperpower¹ with such immense military power that all other nations are left far behind.

The historian Paul Kennedy, author of *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, says:

“This array of force is staggering. Were it ever assembled en masse the result would be the largest concentration of naval and aerial force the world would have seen. ... Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. ... No other nation comes close.”²

The U.S. accounts for half of the world’s annual military expenditures. It is in the nuclear weapons field – the central reason for the existence of Pugwash – that the U.S. demonstrates its

¹ The term “hyperpower” was first coined by French Foreign Minister Hubert Védérine in his book, *France in an Age of Globalization* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), in describing the United States’ current position in world affairs.

² “The Eagle Has Landed: The New U.S. Global Military Position”, by Paul Kennedy, *Financial Times Weekend*, February 1, 2002.

immense technological capacity. It is spending \$100 million a day for the maintenance and refinement of its nuclear weapons.

With the U.S. abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the forthcoming deployment of a national missile defence system leading to the weaponization of space, its rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the formulation of the Nuclear Posture Review, which portends new war-fighting strategies involving a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons, the U.S. is manifesting a nuclear doctrine that directly challenges international law, as embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The reduction in the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. and Russia, contained in the treaty signed May 24, 2002 by Presidents Bush and Putin, would appear to be a step forward. But an examination of the fine print shows the treaty does not provide for the actual dismantling of these weapons and thus does not meet the key principle of irreversibility, one of the 13 Practical Steps that the NPT states (including the U.S.) agreed to in 2000. Not only are the delivery systems not destroyed but large numbers of nuclear weapons can be held as a “responsive force” and as “spares.” Thus the announced reduction of strategic warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012 turns out to allow several thousand additional nuclear weapons (both tactical and strategic) to be maintained for the indefinite future in the arsenals of both countries. This is sleight-of-hand nuclear disarmament.

While both leaders signed, the U.S. clearly dominated this agreement. Russia has long wanted to reduce its nuclear stocks to much lower numbers. It once sought irreversible disarmament and tried to uphold the ABM Treaty. But its inferior economic position, the prospect of more Western help to combat the theft of nuclear materials, and acceptance into the NATO Council have provided combined reasons for Russia’s compliance.

While neither Russia nor any of the other nuclear weapons states can be exonerated from their responsibilities to the world community and to the International Court of Justice to conclude negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the U.S. that is in the dominant position of deciding which way the world will go on nuclear weapons: towards permanence or towards elimination. The U.S. is not only the Western leader, the lynchpin of NATO, and the strongest military power in the world, it has now become the colossus on the world stage. Militarily, it might be able to achieve its goal of “full spectrum dominance” in air, land, sea and space. It is futile to speak of nuclear disarmament today without focusing intensely on the role of the U.S.

In considering the U.S. contributions, positive as well as negative, one must take a far wider view than merely through the prism of the present Administration. History will well record the contribution the U.S. has made to the well-being of the world through its implementation of democracy, support for de-colonization, start-up of the United Nations, implementation of the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe, and its role in the downfall of Communism as an international force. In terms of its creativity in the arts and sciences, its dynamism, its zest for life, the U.S. has been a sparkplug for world development. Now, at a time of supremacy over all nations, that greatness must be called upon as we consider the role of the U.S. in the over-arching issue of our time: the future of nuclear weapons.

In the aftermath of the terrible terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the continuing “war on terrorism,” the U.S. has entered a new period in its history. The present Administration insists that U.S. military superiority is the route to peace and that it will not participate in international agreements that constrain its military superiority.

At the First PrepComm for the NPT 2005 Review (April 8-19, 2002), the U.S. spokesperson admitted openly and unashamedly that it “no longer supports” two of the 13 NPT Practical Steps: the ABM Treaty and the CTBT. Despite its previous commitments, the U.S. claimed the right to set its own rules to correspond to the Nuclear Posture Review. The U.S. government stated:

“The new U.S. approach will consist of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive systems, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defence infrastructure. These elements are interrelated, but have one thread in common – a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.”³

The fundamental contradiction of reduced reliance on nuclear weapons on the one hand, and their maintenance for new offensive purposes on the other, is thus presented to the world. The Nuclear Posture Review states U.S. intentions clearly:

“Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defence capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.”

There the issue is joined. Does the U.S. believe it has made an “unequivocal undertaking” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons? Is the U.S. operating in the “good faith” requirement of Article VI of the NPT?

Not a ‘Pax Americana’

One distinguished American expert who holds that the U.S. is not acting in good faith is Bruce Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information. Writing recently of his meetings with groups of American government officials and military officers in which he frequently asked whether the elimination of nuclear weapons is a serious goal of U.S. policy and policymakers, he stated:

“Not a single person out of many hundreds I have polled voiced the belief that the true intention of the United States is, or ever has been, to abolish nuclear weapons.”⁴

In fact, Blair added:

“Some consider the question itself to be almost frivolous because the prospect of nuclear abolition is deemed so remote as to be implausible.”

The Blair critique of the U.S. stance on nuclear weapons finds a resonance in a growing number of observers.

Three American figures, Jonathan Schell, author of *The Fate of the Earth*, David Cartright, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum, and Randall Forsberg, Executive Director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, issued an “Urgent Call to End the Nuclear Danger.” The

³ My report and assessment of the NPT PrepComm meeting is contained in “The NPT: Crisis and Challenge” www.gsinsitute.org/archives/000095.shtml.

⁴ “Nuclear Time Warp,” *The Defense Monitor*, May, 2002.

statement criticized the U.S. for planning “to keep large numbers of nuclear weapons indefinitely,” and Russia for poorly guarding its warheads and nuclear material.

“The dangers posed by huge arsenals, threats of use, proliferation, and terrorism are linked: The nuclear powers’ refusal to disarm fuels proliferation and proliferation makes nuclear materials more accessible to terrorists.”

Richard Butler, Diplomat in Residence at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, and former head of the U.N. Special Commission to disarm Iraq, has summarized the state of danger to the world:

“As long as nuclear weapons exist, the possibility that they will be used, either by accident or design, is real. Any use of them would be devastating – literally, politically, and morally. It is also axiomatic that as long as any state possesses nuclear weapons, others, including non-state actors, terrorists, will seek to acquire them. And as the number of those possessing nuclear weapons increases, so does the likelihood of their use.”⁵

Butler adds:

“There can be no doubt that without American leadership, the problem will not be solved. The exercise of that leadership requires the adoption and articulation by the United States of a clear and comprehensive policy on the control and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a policy does not exist today.”

Put simply, the issue is this: Faced with a constantly modernized U.S. nuclear arsenal and new high tech systems of which missile defences are only one part, existing nuclear weapons states are likely to retain their nuclear stocks. And more states, seeing that nuclear weapons are the currency of power, may follow India, Pakistan and Israel’s recourse to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The danger of a nuclear catastrophe grows.

By moving the goalposts, the U.S. has put the world on notice that it reserves the right to resort to nuclear weapons against not only those who possess nuclear weapons but also those who brandish chemical or biological weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review unwittingly encourages states to pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction. If the most powerful nation on earth asserts its right to initiate the use of nuclear force, other states now need only to invoke the American logic to justify their nuclear expansion. As Blair points out:

“The lesson of 9/11 for nuclear policy is not that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons should be expanded to cover chemical and biological as well as nuclear contingencies and to pursue more ways to vest them with military utility in the event of a conflict with rogue states or terrorist organizations.

The real lesson, which apparently was lost on the drafters of the Bush review, is that all of these weapons of mass destruction must be completely eliminated. WMD must be universally

⁵ Richard Butler, *Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense*, Westview, 2001, p.xii.

condemned, their possession universally prohibited, and the ban rigorously monitored and enforced.”

This is a time to remind the United States of the words of the 35th President of the U.S., John F. Kennedy, who called for a “strategy of peace” in his famous address to American University, June 10, 1963:

“What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for the children – not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women – not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.”

President Kennedy’s words have echoed through the intervening, turbulent decades. A survey conducted in 2002 by the Liu Center, University of British Columbia, asked respondents in 11 countries – including the three nuclear states in NATO plus Russia and Canada – their views on nuclear issues. Eighty-eight percent of Germans, 83 percent of Canadians, 78 percent of Russians, and 61 percent in the U.S. strongly endorse a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapons. Such numbers are reflected in equal strength in countries such as Brazil, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, and India.⁶

Former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who released the poll, stated :

“As these results show, there is a broad-based, global constituency yearning for significant measures to end the nuclear nightmare that has beset the world for over half a century. Contrary to conventional wisdom, people do care about such matters and want their political leaders to respond.”⁷

[Immediately after September 11, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said efforts to implement fully the relevant treaties to stop the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction should be “redoubled.”](#) Unfortunately, such treaties are under siege.

[How can the NPT be saved from further erosion and eventual collapse? Under-Secretary-General Dhanapala has put the answer squarely: “The disarmament community must ... rekindle the public campaign for nuclear disarmament.”](#)⁸ [The obstacles to “rekindling,” however, are enormous. The general media ignore the issue and the foundations that funded nuclear disarmament work for the past several years are cutting back their interest and funding in this area. Even other elements of the civil society movements \(e.g. development, environment, human rights\) seem oblivious to the nuclear danger \(and its impact on their own work\); thus there is little amalgamation of the totality of civil society strength to make a dramatic effect on the nuclear weapons states \(NWS\).](#)

[The “culture of war” mentality of governments must be overcome by those who continue to work valiantly for a “culture of peace.” It is urgent to press the NWS to fulfill their commitments. The](#)

⁶ “Global Poll Shows World Perceived as More Dangerous Place,” The Centre for Public Opinion and Democracy, May 16, 2002 < www.liucentre.ubc.ca/surveys/media/releases/160502release.pdf>.

⁷ *The Globe and Mail*, June 2, 2002, p.A15.

⁸ Speech by Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, April 16, 2002.

NWS, including the U.S., are not impervious to the opinion of important governments. Middle-power governments need to hear, at this challenging moment, from informed civil society leaders who have the ability to bring forward strong arguments for specific actions to save the NPT. Most importantly, these civil society groups can encourage and buttress the efforts of like-minded governments.

The Role of Pugwash

No civil society actor is better placed than Pugwash to make an informed, credible contribution to this new debate. Pugwash began the dialogue process between American and Soviet scientists at a time when the deep freeze of the Cold War had shut down meaningful communication between the two Cold War enemies and allowed gross distortions of each other's positions for ideological reasons. The Pugwash dialogue produced statements that influenced policymakers in both countries. As Sir Joseph Rotblat recently observed, Pugwash can share with other leading groups some credit for the fact that a nuclear war was avoided.⁹ Rotblat and the Pugwash movement won the Nobel Peace Prize for "their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and, in the longer run, to eliminate such arms."¹⁰ Pugwash is not be able, by itself, to turn government policies around, but there is no doubt that the movement is unique in possessing an extraordinary combination of knowledge, competence, credibility and prestige in speaking out on the issue with which it is most closely associated: the nuclear weapons issue. Certainly in my own country, Canada, Pugwash statements are given serious attention by the political, diplomatic and official infrastructure.

In the present climate, the La Jolla Pugwash conference takes on special importance. The fact that the conference is being held in the United States, combined with the need for the U.S. government to hear the Pugwash message, presents a special opportunity. In the face of U.S. hostility to genuine nuclear disarmament, the Canadian Pugwash Group encourages Pugwash to insist that the U.S. must join in the fulfillment of the 13 Practical Steps of the NPT.¹¹

Pugwash must never allow the naysayers of nuclear disarmament to push this issue aside.

In presenting its post-conference statement, the Pugwash Council can influence not only the U.S. government but also governments and civil society movements around the world. The thrust of that message should be that, the present climate notwithstanding, the abolition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction should not be a receding goal but asserted anew as the only certain way to avoid a future catastrophe for humanity.

The Canadian Pugwash Group recognizes that Pugwash will continue to address the broad canvass of threats to human security as posed by diverse aspects of militarism, economic and social inequities, environmental disruption, and gross violations of human rights. The components of the integrated agenda for security must continually be advanced because all make a contribution to removal of the causes of war. But the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons must be kept in the forefront. This is the issue on which Pugwash speaks with authority, and this is the issue that is the precondition for enduring peace in the 21st century.

⁹ "The Nuclear Issue: Where Do We Go from Here?" Address by Sir Joseph Rotblat to IPPNW 15th World Congress, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2002.

¹⁰ Press release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, 1995, found at <http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1995/press.html>

¹¹ The 13 Steps, as excerpted from the NPT 2000 Review Final Document, are attached to this paper as Appendix "A".

At this critical moment, Pugwash must reaffirm two over-arching principles: nuclear weapons are immoral and their use is illegal.

The Moral and Legal Case Against Nuclear Weapons

The moral case against nuclear weapons is clear-cut. Nuclear weapons assault life on the planet, they assault the planet itself, and in so doing they assault the process of the continuing development of the planet. This is an affront to the mysterious process of creation that makes a connection between us and an unfathomably distant past that the present generation has no right to interrupt. Nuclear weapons lure us into thinking we can control the destiny of the world. They invert order into disorder. Nuclear weapons are evil because they destroy the process of life itself.

Nuclear weapons are supposed to be governed by the covenants of humanitarian law. In fact, a full-scale nuclear war would destroy the very basis of humanitarian law. The structure of our civilization would disappear. Nuclear weapons, with no limitation or proportionality in their effect, make a mockery of old “just war” theories. How can self-defence be cited as a justification for the use of nuclear weapons when their full effect destroys the “self” that is supposed to be defended?

During the Cold War, political acceptance of nuclear weapons to deter “the enemy” became the over-riding consideration. When the Soviets disappeared as the enemy, the nuclear establishment had to find a new one. This time the enemy is some political leader, now or in the future, who will threaten the West with a nuclear weapon. The circle of fear, perpetuated by those with a vested interest in maintaining nuclear weapons, is unending. Unchallenged, this is a trap humanity will never escape from.

Discussions on ethics frequently become esoteric, not to mention divisive. But a new global ethic can be expressed sharply, succinctly, and irrefutably, as the 1993 World Parliament of Religions did: “Every human being must be treated humanely!”

This echoed Pugwash’s dramatic appeal contained in the 1955 manifesto issued by a group of Pugwash scientists led by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein who, having worked on the development of the atomic bomb, called for its abolition: “We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.”

The nuclear powers must be challenged, for, in clinging to spurious, self-serving rationales, they are deliberately deceiving the world. The gravest of futures lies ahead for humanity if the world is to be ruled by militarism rather than law. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence can no longer claim the slightest shred of moral acceptance: it is morally bankrupt. The dangers of proliferation make it essential that credible organizations, such as Pugwash, tell policy-makers that nuclear weapons are immoral. Military doctrines justifying the maintenance of nuclear deterrence must be forthrightly condemned. Nuclear planners would then be deprived of any further claim to moral legitimacy.

Similarly in the legal realm, the time has come for governments to formally declare that the use of nuclear weapons is per se unlawful based upon the rules of international law. A world ruled by law is the only hope for a peace with security and stability.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made a profound contribution to de-legalizing nuclear weapons by reaffirming the cardinal principles of humanitarian law, which are the following: in order to protect the civilian population, states must never use weapons that are incapable of

distinguishing between civilian and military targets; it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants, and hence states do not have unlimited freedom of choice of weapons. Simply because nuclear weapons were invented after the established principles and rules of humanitarian law had first come into existence does not mean that humanitarian law does not apply to them.

The so-called “loophole” in the ICJ Opinion – that the Court could not decide whether the use of nuclear weapons would be legal in cases of extreme self-defence – must now be closed. It is a canard to state, as nuclear retentionists do, that a nuclear weapon can be used in a proportionate or limited way, even using so-called “low-yield” weapons in defence.

In his comprehensive work, *Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post Cold War World*,¹² Charles J. Moxley, Jr. documented how the U.S. misrepresented existing law in its submission to the Court. The U.S. held that the effects of low-yield nuclear weapons need not be materially greater than those of conventional weapons. Moxley pointed out that the radiation effects of such weapons are uncontrollable, and that the U.S. must be held accountable to an international law that prohibits any use of a nuclear weapon.

It is time to press forward, as the Court suggested, to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would prohibit the possession, development, threat, and use of nuclear weapons. The Court’s opinion enables politicians and activists who support nuclear disarmament to take a stronger legal position against nuclear retentionists, who are now vulnerable to accusations of flouting international law. The Court’s opinion challenges NATO’s doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and that challenge must now be taken up.

The contradiction between what the NATO states say in the NPT context and do in holding onto their nuclear arsenals is astonishing for its brazenness. The very same countries that pledge an “unequivocal undertaking” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons then, in the next breath, re-affirm that nuclear weapons are “essential.” The double-speak is breathtaking. With NATO and Russia now in partnership, Pugwash is better placed than ever to call for the removal of all of NATO’s and Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons in Russia and seven Western European countries. There is neither political nor legal justification to maintain these tactical nuclear weapons.

There are other important actions to take, which the 13 Practical Steps outline. Foremost among them is to ensure that the moratorium on nuclear testing not be broken.

A New Way of Thinking

Pugwash must help promote attitudinal change in society so that it seeps into moral and legal thinking to both stimulate and sustain new government policies. As Pugwash has maintained from its inception, echoing Einstein, a whole new way of thinking about nuclear weapons is required to effectuate change. This is also the goal of UNESCO in promoting knowledge of a culture of peace.

A culture of peace is the set of values, attitudes, traditions, modes of behaviour and ways of life that inspire respect for all life, rejection of violence, and promotion of all human rights. A culture of peace is a process of individual, collective and institutional transformation. It grows out of beliefs and actions of the people themselves and develops in each country within its specific historical, socio-cultural and economic context. Mobilizing public opinion and developing new education programs, at all levels, are essential.

¹² Charles J. Moxley, Jr., *Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post Cold War World*, Austin & Winfield, 2000.

The themes of a culture of peace form the architecture for a right to peace. The protection of the right to life and bodily security are at the heart of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When a weapon has the potential to kill millions of people in one blast, human life becomes reduced to a level of worthlessness that totally belies human dignity as understood in any culture. No weapon invented in the long history of warfare has so negated the dignity and worth of the human person as has the nuclear bomb. The most devastating attack on the Declaration of Human Rights comes from those who would assault the very existence of human life on the planet.

We are yet some distance from a general societal understanding that the right to peace demands the abolition of nuclear weapons. Yet a vision of morality and law, fully developed, will bring us to this understanding. While we must bring our heads to this matter, we must also bring our hearts.

The Canadian Pugwash Group rejects the thinking of those who hold that the end of nuclear weapons is at least 100 years away and that until then “we must live with nuclear weapons as responsibly and quietly as we can.” That is dangerous pessimism. The world does not have 100 years to stamp out this pernicious cancer that continues to threaten global and human security. There are too many people suffering, too much political frustration, too much potential for global devastation, to allow a mood of passivity. The abolition of nuclear weapons will not, by itself, bring peace, but it will allow the international community to deal more effectively with other threats to peace.

All great historical ideas for change go through three stages: first, the idea is ridiculed; then it is vigorously objected to; finally, it is accepted as conventional wisdom. The movement to abolish nuclear weapons has entered the second stage. This is no time to put the goal on hold. Pugwash should lead the world in pushing the debate into the third and final stage.

13 Steps

EXCERPTED FROM THE NPT 2000 REVIEW FINAL DOCUMENT

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
 - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
 - Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
 - The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
 - Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
 - The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world.